An experiment on case-based decision making by Grosskopf, Brit et al.
An Experiment
on CaseBased Decision Making
Brit Grosskopf Rajiv Sarin Elizabeth Watson
University of Exeter Trinity University
February 10, 2015
Abstract
We experimentally investigate the disposition of decision makers
to use casebased reasoning as suggested by Hume (1748) and formal-
ized by CaseBased Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995).
Our subjects face a monopoly decision problem about which they
have very limited information. Information is presented in a manner
which makes similarity judgements according to the feature matching
model of Tversky (1977) plausible. We provide subjects a history
of cases. In the 22 betweensubject design, we vary whether in-
formation about the current market is given and whether immediate
feedback about obtained prots is provided. The results provide sup-
port for the predictions of CaseBased Decision Theory, particularly
when no immediate feedback is provided.
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1 Introduction
Considerable decision making in economics occurs in complex environments
in which the decision makers knowledge of the payo¤ function she faces is
severely constrained. Very little is known about decision making procedures
in such environments. Expected utility theory does not seem plausible in
such situations and, furthermore, cannot be used to make meaningful predic-
tions. It seems reasonable to suppose that people use a variety of procedures
or decision making algorithms in such complex environments in which the
decision makers information is severely limited.
A theory of decision making which is suitable for complex environments
follows from the ideas of the late Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-
1776). According to Hume (1748), From causes which appear similar we
expect similar e¤ects. Hume went on to assert that This is the sum of all
our experimental conclusions. A recent formulation of decision making by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) provides a formalization of the ideas of Hume.
In Gilboa and Schmeidlers CaseBased Decision Theory (CBDT) actions
are evaluated according to the similarity weighted sum of payo¤s they have
yielded in similar problems.
In this paper we test whether decision makers use casebased reason-
ing in making their choices when given information that makes similarity
judgements of a particular kind salient. Specically, a featurebased simi-
larity function (Tversky, 1977) seems plausible given the description of the
decision problem the subjects face in our experiment. Given the salience
of the featurebased similarity function, we are able to predict the choices
that a casebased decision maker (DM) would make and can compare those
predictions with actual behavior of participants in the experiment. This al-
lows us to test whether our subjects employ CBDT, assuming featurebased
similarity, in their decision making.
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This paper is not aimed to test the (axiomatically developed) models of
either Gilboa and Schmeidler or Tversky, in which case it would be more
suitable to test if people behave according to their respective axioms. Nor,
is this paper aimed at deriving the similarity functions people use. For this
a very di¤erent experimental design would be optimal. Rather, we aim to
see if the combined models have predictive power in environments in which
expected utility theory has little predictive power. Specically, we investi-
gate if people choose according to CBDT in an environment (decision making
task) where the assumption of featurebased similarity seems plausible.
While CBDT has been used in applied work in economics (e.g. nancial
markets, Guerdjikova, 2002 and 2003; housing markets, Gayer et al., 2007;
and capacity planning, Jahnke et al., 2005), little experimental evidence has
been gathered by economists to test the plausibility of the reasoning sug-
gested by Hume which is distinct from what is usually assumed in economics.
Ossadnik et al. (2013) nd support for the predictive power of CBDT in re-
peated decision problems of structural ignorance. Our paper provides a rst
such test for a oneshot decision problem.
CBDT is not proposed as an alternative to or a generalization of the dom-
inant expected utility theory.1 It is thought to be suitable in environments
which are su¢ ciently complex or in which the decision makers information
is severely limited so that the expected utility approach can not plausibly be
used. In such situations, the decision maker may be more likely to rely upon
her past experiences to evaluate current choices and reason in the manner
suggested by Hume.
In order to test the predictions of a simple variant of CBDT and fea-
ture based similarity, we study production choices of a monopolist who is
producing for several independent markets about each of which she has some
1For a formal relation between expected utility theory and CBDT see Matsui (2000).
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knowledge of past cases. In this environment, a casebased decision maker
employing a featurebased similarity function would compare the market
conditions of her past cases,or memory,to the market conditions she is
currently facing and use that similarity measure to weigh the past outcomes
of each of her production choices.
We employ a 22 design, in which we first contrast behavior in situations
in which CBDT can be used with situations in which it cannot be used. We
do this by comparing the choices of a monopolist who has some information
about the current market conditions with choices when the monopolist does
not have such information. In the latter the monopolist has no information
with which to make a (feature-based) similarity comparison. Second, we
analyze if immediate feedback about the obtained prots makes the subject
more (or less) prone to use CBDT. The provision of such information may
potentially confound the use of the simple versions of the models we test.
We do this by either revealing prots from a market right after a production
choice is made or delaying such feedback until production choices have been
made for all of the markets.
Our results provide some support for CBDT. First of all, as expected,
observed choices are di¤erent when participants are given information about
the current market alongside a market history compared to when such
information is not given. More importantly, we nd that for almost all
participants CBDT (coupled with feature based similarity) predicts more
choices correctly than a random choice model. For a signicant subset of
participants CBDT predicts more than half of their choices correctly, and
for a smaller, yet substantial subset, CBDT predicts more than two thirds
of their choices correctly. The support for CBDT is stronger when payo¤
information is delayed until the end of the experiment. We interpret this as
suggesting that CBDT (coupled with feature based similarity) is more salient
when additional information about the performance of the DMs choices is not
4
immediately provided because such information alters the decision making
procedure (and/or the similarity relation) used by the DM.
While featurebased similarity seems to be very salient given our design,
other similarity relations are plausible. For example, subjects could believe
that the production choice with the highest payo¤ in memory will yield the
highest payo¤ in the current market. We nd that if payo¤ information is
given immediately after production choices for each market are made, equally
many participants seem to be guided by CBDT as by the simple heuristic
that assumes that similar production choices yield similar prots independent
of how similar the current market is to the scenario in memory. However,
when such information is not given, CBDT predicts more choices correctly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
CBDT and the notion of similarity. It gives a motivation for the specic
functional form of similarity that we are using. Section 3 explains the
experimental design. Section 4 states the predictions and our hypotheses.
Section 5 discusses the experimental results and Section 6 provides concluding
remarks. Appendix A contains a sample set of instructions and Appendix
B provides additional individual data.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 CaseBased Decision Theory
Often times, decisions have to be made with very little information about the
underlying environment. Consider the following example where only limited
information is available:
The manager of a rm is looking to hire a technician for her
newly established IT department. Her choice set is given by
the applicants for the job. She knows that she is looking for
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a technician who is highly skilled at computer networking, u-
ent in visual basic, and can lead and motivate the rest of the IT
team. She, however, does not know how each candidate would
perform if hired. For example, a candidate may be highly skilled
in all of the requisite areas, but it may turn out that he is going
through a painful divorce and is continuously late for work and of-
ten depressed. Or a candidate may display great leadership and
organizational skills but may turn out to be very poorly skilled at
computer networking. The more she thinks about it the more she
realizes that other problems may also occur and that she has no
way of knowing what they might be or how they might a¤ect the
company. The manager is facing uncertainty, ambiguity, and a
lack of information on several dimensions.
There are several di¢ culties with tting this problem into the framework
of expected utility. First, the states of the world do not naturally suggest
themselves. Second, imagining all of the possible outcomes for each action is
not a trivial task. This would amount to imagining every possible thing that
could happen once an applicant is hired and imagining all of those things for
every possible applicant. Lastly, even after an action has been taken, the
outcome may not reveal the realized state of the world or whether the action
chosen was optimal. For situations like this, when DMs cannot be guided
by expected utility theory, CBDT has been suggested as an alternative.
The basic premise behind CBDT is that a DM uses her past experiences
(or the experiences of others) to help evaluate current choices, rather than
relying on beliefs about certain states of the world occurring. In the above
example, if each job candidate provided references, then the manager could
use the candidates previous performance to help assess how each candidate
would perform if she was hired. In order to help evaluate past outcomes, an
agent possesses a similarity function that quanties how similar the current
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situation is to a past situation. The agent is assumed to compare the current
situation to all available past situations. The more similar the current
situation is to a past situation the more heavily the agent will weigh the
outcome of that past situation. The agent is then assumed to choose the
action that maximizes the sum of the similarity weighted outcomes of all past
situations.
Formally, a casebased DM is assumed to have a memory, M , consisting
of a set of cases. A case consists of a problem or situation, q, the action
chosen in that situation, a, and the utility, u(r), gained from choosing action
a in situation q and receiving the result (or outcome or consequence) r.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) provide axioms under which a casedbased
DM behaves as if he possesses a similarity function, s(p; q), which evaluates
the similarity between the current situation and any past situation. When
confronted with a problem, p, the casebased DM chooses the action a that
maximizes
U(a) = Up;M(a) =
X
(q;a;r)2M
s(p; q)u(r); (1)
where s (p; q) measures the similarity between the current situation p and
some past situation q. When considering any action a, the casebased DM
only concerns herself with past situations in which that particular action was
chosen. If in a past situation action a was not chosen, then the result and
the subsequent utility obtained in that situation are ignored.2
In other words, a casebased DM adds up, over all cases in her memory,
the similarity weighted utility that each action has received.3 Whichever
2For a version of casebased decision theory that allows the agent to use such informa-
tion, see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997).
3CBDT usually does not make any distinction between an action that resulted in zero
utility and one that simply was not chosen, since zero utility is typically taken as the
default aspiration level.
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action has the largest sum is the action that is predicted to be chosen in
the current situation. Note that this means that any action that has never
been chosen in the past will not be chosen in the current situation unless all
actions chosen in the past resulted in negative utility.4
2.2 Similarity
Lets reconsider the example of the IT manager. Assume the manager
received equally outstanding references for two candidates (Betty and Bob)
and she must decide between them. Suppose Bobs reference was from a
previous job in which he designed and maintained webpages. However,
Bettys reference was from a previous job in which she was the head of a
large corporations IT department and was responsible for maintaining all
networking. It seems obvious that the similarity between the past situation
in which Betty was hired and the managers current one is greater than the
similarity between the past situation in which Bob was hired and the current
one. Therefore Bettys outstanding recommendation will receive more weight
than Bobs and the manager will choose to hire Betty.
While the above example seems intuitive, we have to consider a specic
form for the similarity function in order to obtain actual choice predictions
from CBDT. While the notion of similarity has not been widely studied in
the economics literature, it has been the subject of much discourse in the
psychology literature (see Goldstone and Son, 2005 for an overview).5 Most
of the models of similarity can be divided into two groups: geometric models
and featurematching models.
Geometric models assume that the objects that are being evaluated can
be represented in some ndimensional space. The (dis)similarity between
4In such a scenario a casebased DM is assumed to randomly choose an action from
the set of available actions that have not yet been chosen.
5See Rubinstein (1988) and Sarin and Vahid (2004) for previous applications in eco-
nomics.
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two objects is then calculated as some measure of distance between the two
objects. The most typical measures are the Euclidean distance and the City
Block distance. While these models have desirable mathematical properties,
experimental studies have shown that they do not do well in representing
how subjects actually perceive similarity (see Goldstone and Son, 2005 and
Tversky, 1977 for overviews).6
In response to some of these ndings, Tversky (1977) developed a model
of similarity that assumes that objects can be described by a set of features
and that similarity is dened over the features that two objects have in
common and those that they do not have in common. This allows an agent
much more exibility in measuring the similarity between two objects, and
also allows similarity to be measured among objects that do not naturally
lend themselves to placement in some ndimensional space. Specically,
Tverskys model says that similarity is calculated in the following manner.
Let A be the set of features associated with object a and let B be the set of
features associated with object b. The measure of how similar a is to b is
given by s(a; b) = f(A \ B)   f(A   B)   f(B   A); where ; ; and 
are positive constants and f is an interval scale that represents the salience
or prominence of various features. Thus, the similarity between two objects,
a and b, is a function of the set of features the two have in common, those
that a has but b does not, and those that b has but a does not. This allows
the measure of similarity between a and b to be positive or negative and it
allows the similarity between a and b to di¤er from the similarity between b
6In particular, several of the properties of the geometric models are consistently violated
by experimental subjects. First, it has been shown that the identity property does not
hold, i.e. subjects do not always perceive an object as identical to itself (see Podgorny
and Garner, 1979). Second, actual similarity evaluations are not always symmetric (see
Holyoak and Gordon, 1983; and Ortony et al., 1985). For instance, a subject reporting
that domestic cats are very similar to tigers does not necessarily indicate that the same
subject will report that tigers are very similar to domestic cats. Lastly, the triangle
inequality often does not hold, nor does transitivity (Tversky and Gati, 1982). Finding
objects A and B very similar and objects B and C very similar does not necessarily
indicate that the subject will nd objects A and C very similar.
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and a.
In order to remain within the bounds of CaseBased Decision Theory,
we use a simplied version of Tverskys feature based similarity function
when calculating its predictions in our setup. The underlying axioms of
CBDT imply that the similarity function a casebased DM uses can only
take on values between 0 and 1. To achieve this we choose  =  = 0 to
prevent the similarity function from taking negative values. We assume that
all features are given the same weight when calculating similarity, i.e. it is
not more important to have feature 1 in common than it is to have, say,
feature 2 in common. We let f count the number of features two objects
have in common. CBDT assumes that if two objects are identical then the
similarity between them is equal to 1 and that it is equal to 0 if they have
no features in common. To ensure this we set the parameter  equal to the
reciprocal of the maximum number of features two objects could possibly
have in common.7 With the additional assumption of u(r) = r the decision
problem of a casebased DM can be formulated as choosing
max
a
U(a) = Up;M(a) =
X
(q;a;r)2M
f (p \ q) r: (2)
3 Experimental Design
Since this is the rst experimental investigation of casebased decision mak-
ing for one shot decision problems, there are several aspects of the design
that need detailed discussion. We will rst give a general description of
the individual decision making framework we use and then explain why we
made particular design choices. Special attention is paid to the manner in
7If one only knows if attributes are equal or not, one can represent it as the city block
distance in a model where the new attribute aij is an indicator of the old attribute bi and
takes the value vi. This is standard encoding of qualitative variables as indicator ones in
econometrics.
10
which we induce the decision makers memory, how the similarity between
the current and the pastproblems is generated and how the complexity of
the task is created.
Subjects acted as monopolists making production choices for 30 di¤er-
ent and independent markets. In each market, the production choice was
limited to one of four values: 50, 100, 150, or 200. Subjects were informed
that their prots depended on their production choice and some market con-
ditions. Four di¤erent marketing reports (scenarios) with information on
pastmarket conditions and production choices with resulting prots were
displayed for each market. This provided the memory of the DMs. In half
of the treatments subjects were informed about the current market condi-
tions, in the other half they are not. In half of the treatments, after making
a production choice, subjects were informed about their prots from that
market and then moved on to the next market. Otherwise the feedback
about the prots made in each of the markets was delayed until the end of
the experiment. Table I summarizes our 22 betweensubject design.
Table I:
The 22 Experimental Design
Information
Past + Current Past Only
Feedback Immediate 39 subjects 30 subjects
Delayed 33 subjects 31 subjects
Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the experimental interface for the treat-
ment in which immediate feedback and information about the current market
conditions is given.8 In the language of CBDT, the current problem is given
by a Current Market Report that includes features of Market Conditions on
8Screenshots of the other three treatments are given in Appendix C.
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the right hand side of the page. The cases in the DMs memory are given by
four Scenarios that include features of the market conditions. Each case is
listed with an act (Production Value) and an outcome/consequence (Prot).
Figure 1: Screenshot
Oneshot decisions, independence of markets: In the instructions,
and in the questionnaire following the instructions, we made sure that the
subjects understood that the markets were independent from one another
and that decisions made for one market would not a¤ect any other market.9
9We chose to work in a framework where a DM never encounters the same problem
twice. CBDT can, however, be modied to study choices in repeated decision problems
(see, e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001).
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To emphasize that the markets were independent, a di¤erent set of market
conditions was displayed in each market.
Memory: Control over the memory is important in order to make accu-
rate predictions in CBDT. Firstly, we wanted to minimize the e¤ect of any
homemade prior,i.e. memory the subjects brought to the lab with them.
We did this by the novel manner in which we presented the decision problem
and, in particular, our use of symbols. We believe the use of symbols rather
than numbers made it more di¢ cult for subjects to use their extant memory
to deal with the problem at hand. Our use of symbols will be discussed in
more detail when we talk about how we induce similarity.
Secondly, we did not want subjects to builda memory over the 30 dif-
ferent markets they faced during the experiment. We, therefore, emphasized
that markets were independent. We induced a separate and di¤erent mem-
oryfor each of the 30 markets. We did this by displaying four scenarios in
each market. The displayed scenarios and the market conditions which they
represented were di¤erent for each market. For each of the four scenarios,
a di¤erent production choice and the prot that would have been earned
given that production choice and the market conditions, was displayed.10
To ensure that in each market each production value was a possible choice
for a casebased decision maker, each memory contained one observation of
each possible production value. Thus, the memory of each subject, for each
market, consists of 4 scenarios and their descriptions (i.e. the market condi-
tions and their corresponding symbols, the production choices, and resulting
prots).
A casebased decision maker would calculate the similarity between the
current market and the four cases (i.e. four scenarios) in her memory and
use the similarity measure to weigh the prot that was received in each
10See Appendix A for a full set of the instructions.
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case. The production value with the highest similarityweighted prot is the
one that a casebased decision maker would choose. The displayed market
conditions and production values were randomly generated for each market.
While it was possible for prots to be negative for a given decision, overall
accumulated prots could never be negative.
If our subjects adjusted their behavior in response to the actions they
chose (in unrelated markets) and the prots they obtained, then the four cases
that we provided would not be the only basis for their decisions. That is, if
the subjects were (erroneously, because the markets were unrelated) learning
through reinforcement, then our assumptions would not be met and we would
have lost control. We therefore vary whether subjects are informed about
their prots from each market immediately after they make a production
choice or not. If the (prot) feedback is delayed, all prots from all markets
are displayed at the end of the experiment. The delayed feedback condition
eliminates most kinds of reinforcement learning that could have potentially
occurred across the independent markets.
Similarity: In an attempt to make the use of a featurebased simi-
larity function salient we displayed all values of the market conditions as
symbols. Subjects were told that the marketing report in each market was
transmitted by their marketing department with an error that resulted in all
numbers/levels being erased and only symbols being reported.11 Subjects
were informed that the error was consistent, i.e. the same symbol always
meant the same thing for the same market condition, while it could mean
di¤erent things for di¤erent market conditions. All participants faced the
11We used a square, a triangle and a circle. To distinguish shapes easier, we colored
them. Squares were always green, triangles blue and circles orange. Since the experimental
interface included geometric forms and colors, we asked participants after the experiment
how they interpreted those. In particular, participants were asked: If it were the case
that the three symbols you saw during the experiment [symbols again given here] stood
for high, medium and low, which symbol would you think stood for which level? We
found no correlation between any symbol and level.
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same markets in the same order with the same set of scenarios given to them.
There are several reasons we chose to use symbols instead of actual val-
ues. Firstly, it eliminates geometric similarity considerations. Secondly, it
reduces homemade priors. What we discovered in pilot experiments was
that people treated large values of some features closer to other large values
of the feature (and, hence, more similar than) smaller values of the feature.
This is problematic for the simple (original) version of CBDT where similar-
ity can either be 0 or 1. Furthermore, the values interacted with the features
of the decision problem in a way that brought into the lab things we wanted
to control for. For example: homemade priors of the following type were
possible: The temperature is very high today so I shouldnt produce very
much because its too hot for buyers to want to be out shopping. These
observations suggested that the subjects were using similarity relations in
their memory before entering the laboratory to inform the decision task in
the laboratory. We wanted control over the subjects memory and did not
want them to be able to (systematically) use their earlier memory for the
decision tasks they faced in the lab. We believe the use of symbols makes
it more di¢ cult for people to bring their real worldmemories into the lab
in any systematic way. It therefore allows us to test the theory better and
with less interference from similarity relations the subjects may have devel-
oped from life outside the lab. We acknowledge that this might restrict
the external validity of our experiment but we wanted to test the theory as
cleanly as possible. We also acknowledge that the use of symbols could lead
the subjects to think in terms of similarity. However, we believe that even
with values (rather than symbols) people use similarity judgements. With
symbols, we believe, they are more likely to use featurebased similarity as
we assume. That is, we feel the use of symbols gave us better control.
Complexity: CBDT was conceived under the premise that in many de-
cision problems states of the world are neither naturally given nor can they
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be simply formulated. Furthermore, it assumes that often even a compre-
hensive list of all possible outcomes is neither readily available nor easily
imagined. In order to generate a complex enough environment, in which it
is impossible for subjects to gure out potential states of the world or associ-
ated outcomes, we let the prot of the monopolist in a given market depend
on many di¤erent variables that we call market conditions.
We used a total of 12 di¤erent market conditions. Subjects, however,
did not know this. In each market, subjects were only given information
on a random subset of 5 conditions.12 Deriving predictions using a lin-
ear featurebased similarity relation assumes that all market conditions are
equally weighted. We therefore did not want to give the names too much eco-
nomic meaning and have subjects trying to guess which ones might inuence
their sales and therefore their prots as such a behavior would have violated
the assumption of equal weights, we decided to name our market conditions
as neutrally as possible. We came up with Tourist Population, Wind, UV
Factor, Chance of Rain, % of Population Female, Humidity, Tra¢ c Condi-
tions, Temperature, Literacy Rate, Median Age, # of Potential Buyers, and
Gas Price. Subjects never saw the last two conditions: # of potential buyers
or gas price. Subjects did not even know that these conditions existed. For
each market each condition was randomly chosen to have a value of either 1,
2, or 3.
We generated 15 di¤erent payo¤ functions and used each one twice. The
payo¤ functions were not additively separable, varied according to which
choice maximized the payo¤ and di¤ered in the penaltyfor making a non
optimal choice.13 Of the 12 market conditions a randomly selected set of
4 would enter the payo¤ function in each market. Out of the 5 conditions
12The market conditions displayed in the hypothetical scenarios are the same as those
given in the marketing report so that similarity comparisons could be made between them.
13To ensure comparability across treatments, the subjects faced the same payo¤s func-
tion in the same order.
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that the subjects saw in each market, 3 were payo¤ relevant and the other 2
were not. As mentioned before, two conditions (# of potential buyers and
the gas price) were never reported to the subjects. One of these was chosen
at random to enter the payo¤ function in each market.14
We furthermore vary whether subjects are given information about the
current market in addition to the four scenarios in the induced memory. The
treatment without current information acts as a control treatment. Subjects
cannot use casebased reasoning to make their choices if there is no infor-
mation about the current decision problem. Note that all subjects in all
treatments saw the same sequence of market conditions and the underlying
prot functions were the same. Hence, we can make direct comparisons be-
tween the di¤erent treatments. Observed choices in the treatment without
current which coincide with choices that are in agreement with the predic-
tions of CBDT in the treatment with current information are due to factors
which do not involve casebased reasoning. Only the additional choices (in
the treatment with current information) in line with CBDT can be attributed
to casebased reasoning. Note that instead of a treatment that does not pro-
vide the current market report, we could have displayed the current market
report using incomparable information. We prefer the cleaner comparison
between a treatment with current market conditions and one without cur-
rent market conditions as anything else might have confused subjects and
introduced other errors into the decision making process.
The experiments were conducted at the Economic Research Laboratory
at Texas A&M University. Invitations to participate in the experiments
were randomly sent out to undergraduate students in our database of about
1,200 from a diverse background of majors. The experimental interface was
programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). On average the experimental
14An example of a payo¤ function is (:) = 50q 0:009(3C1C2 C3C4)q2 1150 ln(q 48),
where q is the quantity chosen and Ci indicates market condition i.
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sessions lasted about 90 minutes and average earnings were $16.32 with a
minimum of $10.37 and a maximum of $19.56. Additionally, a $5 showup fee
was paid).15 We tested the participantscomprehension in a questionnaire
after reading the instructions. We individually checked their answers and
corrected them in private if necessary. We went over all questions again
aloud.
4 Predictions and Hypotheses
Using the screenshot from Figure 1 as an example, we would like to demon-
strate how CaseBased Decision Theory with a featurebased similarity would
make its predictions.16 For each scenario, a casebased DM would count the
number of conditions for which the symbol that is given in the scenario
matches the symbol that is given in the current market report. Looking at
Figure 1, we can see that scenario 1 has three conditions in which the symbols
are the same as in the current report (namely wind, humidity and temper-
ature). Scenario 2 also has three conditions that show the same symbols
(namely humidity, UV factor and temperature). Scenario 3 and 4 each have
one match (temperature and uv factor, respectively). A casebased DM
then weighs the received prots in each scenario with the similarity count
divided by 5, the total number of conditions and hence possible matches.
Hence, 2380 gets a weight of 3/5, 3880 gets a weight of 3/5 and 5580 and
4240 each get a weight of 1/5. The similarity weighted prot from scenario
2 is the biggest and therefore a casebased DM should choose 100 in this
market.
As for hypotheses, we rst would like to establish that the provision of
information about the current market conditions makes a di¤erence in the
15Sessions varied in size from 4 to 18 participants.
16The relatively coarse and simplied version of the feature based similarity function
that we employ makes the same predictions as a more generalized similarity function used
by Gilboa et. al (2006) in all but one market.
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choice behavior. We then postulate that this di¤erence in choices is driven by
similarity comparisons that subjects make and incorporate into their decision
making through casebased reasoning.
H1: Choices in the treatments when current information is provided are
di¤erent from choices in the treatments when such information is not
provided.
H2: Choices in the treatments when current information is provided are
in line with casebased reasoning. Hence CBDT with featurebased
similarity is a good predictor of choices.
We do not have any hypothesis regarding the timing of the feedback. In-
tuitively, immediate feedback could interfere with our control over the sub-
jects memory and make predictions of CBDT less precise as it could lead to
subjects learningacross markets. Past choices that seemed satisfactory
could be reinforced and hence alter the basis of similarity comparisons.17
We, therefore, check that no such learning was occurring in our analyses of
the data.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 The E¤ect of Current Information
For each market, we conduct Chisquare tests to determine whether behav-
ior di¤ers when current information is given compared to when it is not.18
In 14/30 (13/30) markets, choices in the treatment with current information
17Note that subjects did not even know the range of payo¤s. Any judgement regarding
the satisfaction through the evaluation of obtained payo¤s is highly subjective.
18For the nonparametric tests used in this paper see Siegel and Castellan (1998).
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are signicantly di¤erent from choices in the treatment without current infor-
mation when immediate (delayed) feedback is provided. These Chisquare
tests have to be interpreted with care, however, as frequencies are rather low
in some cells. The test tends to falsely not reject the null, i.e. choices show
up as not signicantly di¤erent from one another when they actually are
(Type II error). We tend to interpret this conservative reading as support
for our rst hypothesis: Choices in the treatments when current information
is provided are di¤erent from choices in the treatments when such informa-
tion is not provided. The question remains as to how people make use of the
provision of current information. Do they do so in the form of casebased
reasoning?
5.2 Absolute Performance of CBDT
We rst analyze how well the predictions of CBDT match observed behav-
ior.19 We are interested in predicting individual behavior rather than the
average behavior of participants. We therefore calculate the mean squared
deviations (MSDs) of the theoretical prediction from the observed choice for
all 30 decisions a subject faced. We do this for each subject (individual
data can be found in Appendix B, Table V). If every markets choice co-
incides with its CBDT prediction a subject would show a MSD of 0, and if
the subject never selected as predicted her MSD would equal 2. If a subject
was choosing randomly, one could interpret this as meaning that her choices
coincide with theoretical predictions 25% of the time (since there are four
choices to choose from). Given that CBDT is a deterministic model, it
seems unsuitable to compare it to a probabilistic one where each entry in the
prediction vector is 0.25.20 We therefore establish the benchmark of random
19For a rst analysis we assume that the aspiration level of a casebased decision maker
is zero. This aspiration level can be easily adapted as we discuss in section 6.2.
20Such a calculation would lead to a MSD of 0.75. In general, the calculation of MSDs
favors probabilistic models over point predictions (see Selten, 1998 for an axiomatization
of quadratic scoring rules).
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choice as being correct 25% of the time and obtaining a MSD of 0 and being
incorrect 75% of the time realizing a MSD of 2. The average over all 30
decisions is then 1.5. Table II shows that CBDT predicts behavior better
than a random choice model for 97% (79.5%) of subjects in the treatment
with delayed (immediate) feedback. In order to see how many choices are
predicted correctly by CBDT we establish two other benchmarks: (1) pre-
dicted choices coincide with observed choices at least half of the time (in 15
out of 30 markets), and (2) predictions coincide with observed behavior at
least twothirds of the time (in 20 out of 30 markets). Table II summarizes
the results and provides support for hypothesis 2 that subjects make use of
current information in the form of casebased reasoning.
Table II:
Observed Frequencies of individual MSDs
when comparing choices to CBDT predictions
CBDT predicts correctly more often than:
Random Half TwoThirds
(>7 choices) (>15 choices) (>20 choices)
(MSD<1.5) (MSD<1) (MSD<0.67)
Immediate Feedback 79.5% (31/39) 25.6% (10/39) 15.4% (6/39)
Delayed Feedback 97.0% (32/33) 39.4% (13/33) 18.2% (6/33)
5.3 An Alternative Heuristic and Relative Performance
of CBDT
Since EUT is not a reasonable alternative decision making procedure in the
environment we consider, we look for simple decision making principles that
deliver predictions in our environment and that can pose as alternatives to
CBDT (other than the random choice model). Heuristics, or rules of thumb,
referring to useful and indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems
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that cannot be handled by logic and probability theory (e.g., Polya, 1954),
suggest themselves. Heuristics allow people to make decisions by simplifying
the complex environments people often face (e.g., Simon, 1955).
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) introduced such a fast and frugal algo-
rithm, called Take the Bestfor a search problem. While we use the same
basic principle as Take the Best, the implementation of this heuristic is
quite di¤erent (and much simpler) in our environment. As such we call this
heuristic the MaxHeuristic in our setting. Our subjects are given four
scenarios for each of the decisions that they are facing, with each possible
production value being chosen and displayed once. The MaxHeuristic (or,
MAX) would predict that a DM chooses the production value that returned
the highest prot among those four scenarios. For example, looking at the
screenshot in Figure 1, a DM is predicted to choose 150, as it returned the
highest prot, 5580, of all the displayed production values. Note that in the
treatment where information about the current market is given this would
mean that DMs ignore that information. In the treatments when such infor-
mation is not given, MAX seems a rather suitable. Note also that even MAX
is based on similarity arguments. The similarity notion is, however, very
di¤erent. MAX is entirely based on the assumption that similar production
choices yield similar prots independent of how similar the current market
conditions are to the scenarios in memory.21 ;22
21Choices predicted by CBDT are di¤erent from those predicted by MAX in all but 7
markets. Note that if only the rank of prot were available instead of the exact prot,
then the results should not change according to the MAX heuristic. Since the focus of this
paper is not the MAX heuristic, we do not vary the design to investigate its robustness.
22As suggested by Karl Schlag, an alternative rule of thumb could be to prioritize simi-
larity, i.e., choose the production value whose scenario has the most features in common
with the current report (as long as its prot is positive). If there are more than one
of those production values, choose the one with the highest prot from this set. If the
production value whose scenario has the highest number of features in common with the
current report has a negative prot associated with it, choose the one that has the next
highest number of features in common. Again, if there are more of those, choose the one
that has the highest prot associated with it. In our experimental setup predicted choices
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Table III demonstrates that CBDT is a better predictor than MAX when
feedback is delayed and current information is provided (i.e., individual MSDs
of observed choices from predicted choices are lower for CBDT). When
feedback is immediately provided and current information is given, CBDT
does not predict a larger proportion of choices when compared to MAX,
indicating that equally many participants seem to be guided by CBDT as
are guided by MAX.
Table III:
CBDT vs. MAX in Treatments w/ current
Robust Rank Order Test zstatistic
Immediate Feedback 0:03
Delayed Feedback  4:27
Note:  indicates signicance on the 5% level
Table IV summarizes the performance of MAX compared to the three
previously established benchmarks. Comparing the performance of CBDT
(as summarized in Table II) when information about the current market is
given and feedback is delayed with the performance of MAX (as summa-
rized in Table IV) we nd that CBDT predicts better than random for more
subjects than MAX (Test of Equality of Proportions: zvalue= 3:61, one
tailed p < 0:001).23 In this treatment, CBDT predicts more than half and
more than two thirds of the choices correctly more often than MAX (Test
of Equality of Proportions: zvalue= 2:87 (1:51), onetailed p = 0:00211
of such a heuristic coincide with predicted choices of CBDT in all but three markets. We
therefore do not separately analyze its predictive power.
23The specic test statistic is z = (p1 p2)=Spc , where pi is the proportion in subsample
i, and Spc =
q
pc(1  pc)( 1N1 + 1N2 ) is an estimate of the standard error of the di¤erence
in proportions, p1   p2. pc is an estimate of the population proportion under the null
hypothesis of equal proportions, pc = (p1N1 + p2N2)=(N1 + N2), where Ni is the total
number of subjects in subsample i (see Glasnapp and Poggio, 1985).
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(0:0655)). When feedback is immediately provided, CBDT and MAX are
equally good when compared to a random choice model or when comparing
the number of choices predicted correctly (more than half and more than two
thirds, respectively).
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Table IV:
Observed Frequencies of individual MSDs
when comparing choices to MAX predictions
MaxHeuristic predicts correctly more often than:
Random Half TwoThirds
(>7 choices) (>15 choices) (>20 choices)
(MSD<1.5) (MSD<1) (MSD<0.67)
Immediate w/ Current 87.2% (34/39) 20.5% (8/39) 10.3% (4/39)
Feedback w/o Current 93.3% (28/30) 33.3% (10/30) 26.7% (8/30)
Delayed w/ Current 60.6% (20/33) 9.1% (3/33) 6.1% (2/33)
Feedback w/o Current 80.6% (25/31) 29.0% (9/31) 12.9% (4/31)
Figures 2 and 3 graphically show the performance of CBDT predictions.
Performance is evaluated by how many of the 30 decisions are predicted cor-
rectly, i.e. coincide with actually observed choices. The cumulative density
of observed choices coinciding with predicted choices is plotted for the di¤er-
ent treatments.24 To make comparisons easier, two vertical lines, referring
to 1/4 (random) and 2/3 (twothirds) of the decisions, are included. The
further the lines are to the right, the more often do the predictions of CBDT
coincide with observed choices. The lower the lines the higher the proportion
of subjects for whom predicted choices coincide with observed choices. The
gures can be tied back to Tables II and IV. In addition to the benchmark of
7.5 correct choices for a random model, we simulated 100 subjects to make 30
decisions randomly. We plot the cumulative probability distribution of the
simulated choices that coincide with actual choices and add them to Figure
2 for comparison.
Figure 2 clearly shows that CBDT does better than a random model.
If one takes 7.5 as the average of correctly predicted choices by the random
24Each subject is characterized by one number that corresponds to how many of her
observed choices coincide with theoretically predicted choices.
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model, than Figure 2 shows that for 79.5% of the subjects CBDT does better
(as indicated in Table II) when feedback is immediate.25 This percentage
is 97% when correctly predicted choices of CBDT are compared with ran-
domly correctly predicted choices when feedback is delayed. However, testing
the distribution of correctly predicted choices reveals no di¤erence between
delayed and immediate feedback (KolmogorovSmirnov test, p = 0:177).
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Figure 2: Cumulative density of choices in line with CBDT predictions
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Figure 3: Cumulative density of choices in line with predictions of CBDT or
MAX
25These percentages are 100% minus the percentage that is found at the intersection of
the solid line with the vertical line at 1/4.
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Figure 3 compares the performance of CBDT with the performance of
MAX. Panel (a) shows that when feedback about prots is immediately
given performance does not di¤er (KolmogorovSmirnov test, p = 1:000).
Panel (b) illustrates that CBDT outperforms MAX when feedback is delayed
(KolmogorovSmirnov test, p = 0:014).
6 Further Analyses of the Results
6.1 Learning
There are di¤erent types of learning that could take place in our experi-
ment. First, it seems natural to ask whether our subjects learn to become
casebased decision makers. If this was the case, we should observe that in-
dividual MSDs (calculated with respect to the CBDT predictions) get smaller
over time. Second, our subjects could learn across markets. For the purpose
of our paper it is important that there be no such learning. In the imme-
diate feedback treatment, in which subjects received feedback about their
performance after each decision, it could be conjectured that some kind of
reinforcement learning could be taking place.
In order to address the rst type of learning we calculate the average
of an individuals MSDs over the rst 15 markets and compare this with
the average of the same individuals MSDs (when calculated with respect
to the CBDT predictions) over the second 15 markets (see Appendix B for
the individual data). We nd that 44% (17/39) show a smaller MSD in
the second half of the experiment when current information is provided and
immediate feedback is given. This percentage is not signicantly di¤erent
from the percentage of those that show an increase in their MSDs, 38.5%
(15/39), (Test of Equality of Proportions, zvalue= 0:46, n.s.). The same
holds when feedback is delayed and information about the current market is
given (18/33 (MSD decreases) vs. 14/33 (MSD increases), Test of Equality of
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Proportions, zvalue= 0:92, n.s.). We can therefore conclude that subjects do
not tend to use CBDT more often over time, i.e. there is no learning towards
becoming a casebased DM. Interestingly, participants seem to follow MAX
more often over time when immediate feedback is given and no information
about the current market is given (21/30 (MSD decreases) vs. 8/30 (MSD
increases), Test of Equality of Proportions, zvalue= 3:36, onetailed p <
0:001). Immediate feedback is driving this result. The MSDs with respect
to MAX do not go down when feedback is delayed (14/31 (MSD decreases)
vs. 10/31 (MSD increases), Test of Equality of Proportions, zvalue= 1:04,
n.s.).
In order to address the second type of learning, we derive predictions from
a reinforcement learning type model in which agents only have information
about the action they take and the payo¤ it obtains. We use the payo¤ as-
sessment learning model (Sarin and Vahid, 1999) in which a DM is assumed
to evaluate actions (j; k) according to their (payo¤) assessments or attrac-
tions (qj; qk).26 The DM chooses the action with the highest attraction. If
she chooses action k at time t and receives a payo¤ of x, then the attraction
of action k at time t+1 becomes qk(t+1) = (1 )qk(t)+x, where  2 [0; 1],
while for all other possible actions j 6= k, qj(t+1) = qj(t). We assume initial
assessments equal to the average of the payo¤s seen in the rst four scenarios
of market 1 and nd the  that best ts the data (through a grid search
method with 0.1 increments). We use this to calculate the individual MSDs
for each subject. We nd that the payo¤ assessment model does better in
the treatments with immediate feedback compared to when feedback is de-
layed (in which case, it is equivalent to the random choice model). However,
it only predicts choices more than half of the time for one subject out of all
the treatments. Its general performance is close to random (MSD = 1:5).27
26Given that our paper aims at explaining individual behavior, we do not simulate a
probabilistic reinforcement learning model (e.g., Roth and Erev, 1995) which would either
lead to comparing choices with a probability vector or analyzing population means.
27Given that there is not much variance in individual MSDs, we determine overall per-
28
We therefore feel condent that there is not much learning going on across
markets.
6.2 CBDT with Di¤erent Aspiration Levels
As mentioned earlier, we derive CBDT predictions assuming an aspiration
level of zero. This can be easily adjusted to include other aspiration levels.
We redid our analysis and set the aspiration level equal to the average payo¤
of all four cases in a DMs memory. We do not observe any participant in
the treatments when current information is provided for whom the adjusted
CBDT predicts more than twothirds of their choices correctly. Unfortu-
nately, the new predictions of CBDT with average aspirations often coincide
with the predictions of the MAX. This makes any distinction between these
two alternative decision making processes impossible. A di¤erent design is
needed to distinguish between alternative aspiration levels for CBDT.
7 Conclusion
We design an experiment to test whether subjects use casebased reasoning
combined with feature based similarity in an individual decision making en-
vironment. Our design makes the use of a featurebased similarity relation
salient. We nd that when similarity comparisons can be made along the
lines we hypothesize, decision makers seem to do so. In particular, for a
signicant subset of the participants CBDT predicts more than half of their
choices correctly, and for a smaller, yet substantial subset, CBDT predicts
more than two thirds of their choices correctly. Note that we are only assum-
formance by calculating the average MSD for each treatment. Interestingly, when no
current information is given, the model that ts best gives a weight of 0.1 to the ob-
tained payo¤ independent of whether immediate feedback is given or not. Behavior seems
quite backward looking. When current information is given, 0.2 returns the lowest
average MSD when immediate feedback is given. However, when feedback is delayed the
lowest average MSD is obtained with a weight of 0.9.
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ing a similarity function in order to derive predictions from CBDT. We are
not actually testing for the plausibility or suitability of the similarity func-
tion. While we cannot distinguish between closely related similarity functions
that our participants might be using, the strength of this paper lies in the
fact that a rather coarse similarity relation can be used to make predictions
that are borne out in the data, i.e. our design is robust to smallchanges
in the similarity function.
It can be argued that our experimental design leads subjects to use the
MAX heuristic. While that may indeed be the case, it only makes it more
striking that some subjects do in fact behave as if they were casebased
decision makers and choose to act as such despite the availability of the
seemingly simpler MAX heuristic.
Our data reveal that CBDT seems more appropriate in situations where
feedback is slow. This is reassuring as CBDT was conceived to be applicable
in complex situations when other learning is not really possible. We think
there are at least two reasons for this. First, when no immediate feedback
is given, the proportion of people who use other, arguably simpler heuristics
(like the Max heuristic) does not increase over time (unlike when immediate
feedback is given). Second, as the payo¤ assessment simulation in section
6.1 shows, a very simple adaptive learning model describes behaviour better
when immediate feedback is given as compared to when such feedback is not
given, indicating that a model allowing for learning across markets tracks
individual behaviour better than one that doesnt. But, as the comparison
with CBDT shows, an adaptive learning model that does not capture the
notion of similarity is not as powerful in predicting individual choices as a
model that incorporates similarity in a way that CBDT does.
It seems reasonable to suppose that people use a variety of procedures or
decision making algorithms in complex environments in which the decision
makers information is severely limited. Our results suggest that people seem
30
to employ Humelike reasoning. However, our ndings also suggest that peo-
ple may be using yet simpler decision making procedures, or heuristics, in
these complex choice environments. As considerable decision making in eco-
nomics occurs in such complex, informationally constrained, environments,
it appears desirable to study further, both theoretically and experimentally,
the decision making procedures agents use in such environments.
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Appendix A Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. Texas A&M
University has provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions
and make good decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. At
the end of todays session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in
cash.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other peoples
work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise
your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim
out loud, etc. you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect
and appreciate your cooperation.
During this session you will be acting as a rm who is selling a good. You
will be selling your good to 30 independent markets. You can think of these
as 30 geographically separated islands. In each of the 30 markets (islands)
you are the only seller of the good. This means that nothing any other
seller or rm does can a¤ect you or your market. Each period represents a
new market and you will have to make a decision about how many units you
want to produce for that market. It is costly to produce this good and if
you produce units that do not get sold in that market, you will NOT be able
to keep those units for use in other markets. At the end of each period you
will earn prots on the units of your good that you do sell in that market.
At the beginning of each period you will receive a Marketing Report
that contains information regarding some Market Conditions for the current
market. You can think of this as information about the market that has been
gathered for you by the Marketing Department of your rm. Gathering this
data is costly to your rm, as such your Marketing Department is not able
to gather all information in every market. Therefore, the information that
your Marketing Department does collect can vary from market to market.
However, nothing you or anyone else does can change what information is
gathered in any market.
After gathering the data the Marketing Department sends it to you. Un-
fortunately there is an error that occurs during that transmission. Instead
of receiving the actual data all you receive is a list of the Market Condi-
tions that were collected and a table of symbols representing the actual data.
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Fortunately the error is consistent. This means that identical symbols for a
given Market Condition represent the same actual data. For instance, if the
Marketing Department gathers data that says median income is $35,000 and
a blue triangle gets transmitted, then whenever the Marketing Department
reports $35,000 for median income it will be transmitted as a blue triangle
in the Marketing Report. However, a blue triangle can also appear for other
Market Conditions, where it does not necessarily stand for $35,000. For
example, if the Marketing Department gathers data on a high ination rate
and this information gets transmitted as a blue triangle, then all Marketing
Reports with a high ination rate will have a blue triangle in the table for
ination rate.
After you have received the Current Marketing Report you will be asked
to choose a Production Value of 50, 100, 150, or 200 units. Your Prots
each period depend on your Production Value and may also depend upon
some of the Market Conditions. After you have made your production
choice, you will be informed of your Prots for that market. You will then
proceed to the next market where you will be given the new markets Current
Marketing Report. You will then be asked to choose a Production Value for
that market. The session will continue in this manner until you have made
production choices for 30 markets.
In order to help you with your decisions, for each market the experi-
menter has included four di¤erent scenarios. In each of these scenarios the
experimenter was given a Marketing Report similar to the Marketing Re-
ports that you will be given. The experimenter then chose a Production
Value in such a manner that each of the four production choices was chosen
once. The Prots reported in these scenarios are the prots that would
have been earned in that market given the reported Market Conditions and
the chosen Production Value. The Prots reported in these scenarios will
NOT be included in your Total Prots. Your Total Prots consist only of
those prots that you earn during the session, i.e. when you are making the
production decision. Your Total Prots will be calculated by simply adding
up the prots you earn in each of your markets.
Figure 1 gives an example of the decision screen. At the top right of the
screen you will see labeled the current market. At the bottom right of the
screen you will see your Total Prots, which will include all Prots you have
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earned so far. On the left side of the screen you will also see a table with the
four scenarios for the current market. In the rst column from the left you
will see labels for the Market Conditions, the Production Values, and Prots.
So in this market, your Marketing Department has gathered information on:
the Tourist Population, the Wind, the Humidity, the UV Factor, and the
Temperature. Looking at the symbols in the table you can see that there is
a blue triangle for Tourist Population in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. This
means that the Tourist Population was the same in both of these scenarios.
You can also see that there is a blue triangle for Humidity in Scenario 3.
While this is the same symbol that was present in Scenarios 1 and 2 for the
Tourist Population, it does not necessarily represent the same thing that it
did for Tourist Population. Below the scenarios you will see the Production
Values and Prots for those scenarios. Again, the Production Values were
chosen so that each value was chosen exactly once. The Prots that you
see are the Prots that would have been earned had the given Production
Value been chosen with the given scenario. On the right side of the screen
you will see the Marketing Report for the current market, in the left hand
column are the symbols representing the data from the report and in the
right hand column are the labels for the di¤erent Market Conditions that are
reported. On the bottom of the screen you will see the menu of choices for
your Production Value.
In order to select a Production Value simply use your mouse to click in
the circle to the left of the value you wish to choose. After clicking in one
of the circles you MUST click the Conrm button before your choice will
be submitted. If you wish to change your choice you may do so at any
time BEFORE clicking the Conrm button. You may change your choice
of Production Value as many times as you wish. However, once you have
clicked the Conrm button you will NOT be able to change your Production
Value for the current market. After you have clicked Conrm a results screen
will appear and inform you of your Prots for the current market. Once you
have nished viewing these results click Continue to move on. After you
have clicked Continue, you will proceed to the next market where you will be
given the new markets Marketing Reports and asked to make a production
choice for that market.
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After you have made production choices for 30 markets the session will
be over. A screen will appear informing you of your Total Prots and Total
Earnings. Your Total Earnings are the amount you will be paid in cash.
Your Total Earnings are calculated by dividing your Total Prots by 6,000.
In other words for every $6,000 in Prots that you made you will earn $1.00
in cash. For instance, if you earn a Total Prot of $96,000 then your Total
Earnings will be $16. If you did not choose to receive a hang tag for parking
then you will receive a $5.00 show-up fee in addition to your Total Earnings.
In that case your Total Payment will be calculated by adding the $5.00 show-
up fee to your Total Earnings. So in the above example your Total Payment
would be $16.00 + $5.00 or $21.00 in cash. However, if you did choose to
take a hang tag for parking your Total Payment will be the same as your
Total Earnings. Once the session is over and everyone has viewed their Total
Earnings you will be called up, one at a time, to be paid privately and in
cash. The session will not be nished until everyone has made decisions for
all 30 of their markets. After you have nished please wait patiently for all
remaining markets to nish.
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Appendix B Individual Data
Table V: Individual MSDs for CBDT and MAX Predictions
Immediate Feedback Delayed Feedback
w/ Current w/o Current w/ Current w/o Current
CBDT Max CBDT Max CBDT Max CBDT Max
0.933 1.333 1.533 0.533 1.067 1.733 1.467 1.067
1.200 1.400 1.400 1.067 0.733 1.267 1.200 1.333
1.600 0.867 1.333 1.067 0.600 1.667 1.467 0.467
0.933 1.467 1.333 0.733 1.200 1.333 1.333 0.933
0.667 1.467 1.267 1.267 0.667 1.667 1.400 0.933
1.667 1.733 1.600 0.600 0.933 1.067 1.333 1.467
1.333 1.333 1.667 1.067 0.333 1.667 1.533 0.133
1.533 0.467 1.533 1.333 0.733 1.067 1.333 1.267
1.533 0.200 1.333 0.600 1.467 0.067 1.533 1.600
1.133 1.067 1.333 0.400 1.000 1.600 1.467 1.533
1.333 1.267 1.400 1.333 1.267 1.200 1.200 1.133
1.267 1.533 1.600 1.067 1.333 1.533 1.267 1.400
1.467 0.867 1.333 1.133 1.067 1.533 1.533 1.600
1.267 1.133 1.133 0.667 1.133 1.000 1.267 1.000
1.000 1.200 1.067 1.067 1.200 1.533 1.400 1.533
1.200 1.000 1.200 1.533 0.467 1.533 1.333 1.333
0.600 1.467 1.333 1.000 1.467 1.200 1.467 1.067
0.667 1.200 1.200 0.867 1.000 1.133 1.600 1.467
1.467 0.600 1.467 1.067 1.333 1.067 1.400 1.200
1.333 0.933 1.200 1.333 1.400 1.133 1.267 1.533
1.333 1.533 1.667 0.333 0.867 1.267 1.267 1.267
1.200 1.000 1.533 0.467 1.533 1.333 1.400 0.600
1.467 1.267 1.267 1.067 1.467 0.200 1.533 1.667
0.400 1.600 1.467 1.200 1.267 1.067 1.267 1.333
1.733 1.333 1.400 1.333 0.200 1.733 1.533 0.933
1.600 0.933 0.867 1.667 1.400 1.467 1.267 1.200
0.667 1.400 1.467 1.000 1.067 1.800 1.600 0.733
1.467 1.400 1.600 1.467 1.000 0.867 1.733 0.467
0.600 1.267 1.133 1.333 0.733 1.600 1.533 0.867
1.000 1.600 1.600 0.600 0.933 1.200 1.200 1.200
0.933 1.267 1.200 1.267 1.333 1.333
1.133 1.200 0.200 1.467
1.600 0.067 0.733 1.733
1.067 1.067
1.267 1.400
0.800 1.467
1.200 1.133
1.600 1.133
1.133 1.267
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Table VI: Blocks of 15 rounds of Individual MSDs
for CBDT and MAX (w/ Current)
Immediate Feedback Delayed Feedback
CBDT Max CBDT Max
115 1630 115 1630 115 1630 115 1630
0.800 1.067 1.467 1.200 1.333 0.800 1.733 1.733
1.200 1.200 1.467 1.333 0.400 1.067 1.600 0.933
1.600 1.600 1.067 0.667 0.267 0.933 1.467 1.867
1.067 0.800 1.200 1.733 1.067 1.333 1.600 1.067
1.200 0.133 1.467 1.467 0.933 0.400 1.867 1.467
1.867 1.467 1.733 1.733 0.667 1.200 0.933 1.200
1.467 1.200 1.467 1.200 0.400 0.267 1.600 1.733
1.467 1.600 0.800 0.133 1.067 0.400 0.400 1.733
1.467 1.600 0.400 0 1.333 1.600 0.133 0
1.067 1.200 0.933 1.200 1.333 0.667 1.733 1.467
1.600 1.067 1.600 0.933 0.933 1.600 1.600 0.800
1.467 1.067 1.467 1.600 1.200 1.467 1.467 1.600
1.467 1.467 1.200 0.533 0.800 1.333 1.733 1.333
1.333 1.200 1.333 0.933 1.333 0.933 0.800 1.200
0.933 1.067 1.200 1.200 1.067 1.333 1.733 1.333
1.333 1.067 1.067 0.933 0.533 0.400 1.600 1.467
0.800 0.400 1.600 1.333 1.333 1.600 0.933 1.467
0.800 0.533 1.200 1.200 1.333 0.667 1.067 1.200
1.467 1.467 0.800 0.400 1.600 1.067 1.067 1.067
1.330 1.333 0.800 1.067 1.333 1.467 1.333 0.933
1.200 1.467 1.467 1.600 0.933 0.800 1.467 1.067
1.067 1.333 1.200 0.800 1.467 1.600 1.067 1.600
1.600 1.333 1.200 1.333 1.600 1.333 0.133 0.267
0.667 0.133 1.733 1.467 1.067 1.467 1.333 0.800
1.867 1.600 1.333 1.333 0.267 0.133 1.733 1.733
1.467 1.733 1.067 0.800 0.933 1.867 1.333 1.600
0.800 0.533 1.200 1.600 1.333 0.800 1.733 1.867
1.067 1.867 1.467 1.333 1.067 0.933 1.067 0.667
0.533 0.667 1.333 1.200 0.800 0.667 1.867 1.333
0.933 1.067 1.733 1.467 1.200 0.667 0.933 1.467
1.200 0.667 1.067 1.467 1.200 1.200 0.933 1.600
1.200 1.067 1.333 1.067 0.400 0 1.333 1.600
1.600 1.600 0.133 0 0.933 0.533 1.867 1.600
1.067 1.067 1.333 0.800
1.200 1.333 1.333 1.467
1.200 0.400 1.467 1.467
1.067 1.333 1.067 1.200
1.333 1.867 1.333 0.933
0.800 1.467 1.333 1.200
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Table VII: Blocks of 15 rounds of Individual MSDs
for CBDT and MAX (w/o Current)
Immediate Feedback Delayed Feedback
CBDT Max CBDT Max
115 1630 115 1630 115 1630 115 1630
1.467 1.600 0.800 0.267 1.200 1.733 1.467 0.667
1.333 1.467 1.333 0.800 1.467 0.933 1.200 1.467
1.333 1.333 1.333 0.800 1.600 1.333 0.400 0.533
1.200 1.467 0.933 0.533 1.333 1.333 0.800 1.067
1.333 1.200 1.200 1.333 1.200 1.600 0.933 0.933
1.333 1.867 0.800 0.400 1.200 1.467 1.467 1.467
1.467 1.867 1.333 0.800 1.467 1.600 0.267 0
1.467 1.600 1.600 1.067 1.333 1.333 1.333 1.200
1.067 1.600 0.800 0.400 1.467 1.600 1.600 1.600
1.333 1.333 0.400 0.400 1.467 1.467 1.467 1.600
1.333 1.467 1.200 1.467 1.333 1.067 1.067 1.2
1.600 1.600 1.333 0.800 1.333 1.2 1.333 1.467
1.067 1.600 1.733 0.533 1.467 1.600 1.733 1.467
1.200 1.067 0.800 0.533 1.333 1.200 0.667 1.333
0.800 1.333 1.467 0.667 1.333 1.467 1.600 1.467
1.333 1.067 1.467 1.600 1.333 1.333 1.200 1.467
1.067 1.600 1.333 0.667 1.200 1.733 1.467 0.667
1.067 1.333 0.800 0.933 1.600 1.600 1.467 1.467
1.333 1.600 1.633 0.533 1.467 1.333 1.067 1.333
1.333 1.067 1.067 1.600 1.067 1.467 1.467 1.600
1.600 1.733 0.533 0.133 1.467 1.067 1.200 1.333
1.467 1.600 0.667 0.267 1.467 1.333 0.533 0.667
1.200 1.333 1.200 0.933 1.600 1.467 1.867 1.467
1.467 1.467 1.333 1.067 1.333 1.200 1.600 1.067
1.333 1.467 1.200 1.467 1.733 1.333 1.067 0.800
1.067 0.667 1.467 1.867 1.333 1.200 1.333 1.067
1.467 1.467 1.200 0.800 1.600 1.600 1.067 0.400
1.600 1.600 1.733 1.200 1.733 1.733 0.800 0.133
1.200 1.067 1.467 1.200 1.600 1.467 0.933 0.800
1.600 1.600 0.533 0.667 1.333 1.067 0.933 1.467
1.200 1.467 1.200 1.067
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Appendix C More Screenshots
Figure 1: Figure 4: Screenshot of Immediate without Current
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Figure 5: Screenshot of Delayed with Current
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Figure 6: Screenshot of delayed without Current
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